We examine Steel Partner's investments and shareholder activism at three firms, United Industrial Corp (the Good), Ronson Corp (the Bad), and BKF Capital (the Ugly). The cases suggest the following points. For managers and boards wishing to maintain their independence the lesson is to dig in and refuse to negotiate, preferably while maintaining a big ownership stake. However, forcing the activist to go hostile might not be a great idea as it might lead to a lawsuit or an insatiable wolf-pack type campaign. For the activists, patience can be a virtue. However, do not let the desire for "success" come at the expense of profitability. Success was achieved at BKF and was probably a quixotic venture at Ronson. In both cases, Steel Partners lost a great deal of money and experienced opportunity costs. In contrast, Steel involvement at UIC can be seen as a model of successful activism, both in terms of achieving goals and making a substantial profit.
Introduction
Hedge funds have been among the most vocal shareholder activists in recent years. A recent survey of activists indicates the trend will only get stronger in 2009. 1 There are several broad studies of hedge fund activism. 2 Generally, the studies find positive abnormal returns surrounding the filings of Schedule 13Ds indicating the acquisition of a 5% stake and the possibility of efforts to influence management. However, it is less clear whether all the motivations for the activism are value enhancing. Greenwood and Schor (2009) report the abnormal returns are significant only if the target firm is ultimately acquired. Moreover, the studies find mixed evidence regarding the long term impact of the activism on both share price and operating performance.
Perhaps the reason for the mixed evidence regarding the long-term performance is that successful activism is difficult to define. For example, managers desiring the "quiet life" (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003 ) might accede to a portion of the activists demands simply to get the activist to go away. Moreover, even successful activism might have unintended consequences which are not value enhancing.
Managers of the target companies frequently complain that outside activists do not have the necessary expertise to understand the business of the target. Moreover, many managers will see the effort as a threat to their jobs or autonomy. As a result, it is likely that the target management will resist making the changes proposed by the activists. Alternatively, they will try to do just enough to make the activist turns its attention elsewhere.
In addition to differing performance among hedge fund targets, there is little agreement about even the desirability of this activism. The large block holdings amassed by hedge funds aids in overcoming the free rider problem (see Grossman and Hart, 1980, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 ). However, hedge fund activists are frequently criticized for their short-term outlook and for their narrow focus on their own interests as opposed to those of shareholders in general (see Kahan and Rock, 2007 for a thorough discussion of these two criticisms).
We focus on the activism efforts of Steel Partners. Steel has been one of the more active funds; from 1995 to 2006, they filed 13D forms at 63 companies. 3 We examine three of their targets -BKF Capital Group Inc. (BKF), United Industrial Corp (UIC), and Ronson Corp.
Steel's activism at these companies achieved remarkably different degrees of success.
Our examination of the activism efforts at the three companies yields some interesting lessons. One definition of a successful campaign employed by current empirical studies is a campaign in which the target management agrees to at least some of the hedge fund demands.
However, the BKF example clearly indicates this definition is problematic. BKF quickly compromised and altered its governance structure in the face of a concerted "wolf-pack"
campaign. Even so, Steel Partners continued its proxy fight, winning three seats. Unfortunately, Steel did not adequately consider the ill-will its campaign engendered at the target. Many key fund managers left, taking their clients with them. Over the fifteen months following the proxy fight victory, BKF returned -89.4% before delisting by the NYSE.
The longest post-filing windows used to examine performance among current studies are three years (Clifford, 2007) and 18 months (Brav et al., 2008, Greenwood and Schor, 2009 
Brief overview of hedge fund shareholder activism studies
There are several broad studies of shareholder activism by hedge funds in the U.S. While these studies are similar in using 13D filings to create their samples, some (e.g., Klein and Zur, 2009 ) do not include non-confrontational activism. Plus, they typically have different approaches to the identification of control firms. Even so, a few common themes emerge. The typical target of the activism is relatively small, has more cash than their controls or industry, has exhibited solid operating performance, but has lower market to book ratios.
Overall, the studies find significant abnormal returns of roughly 5 to 11% in the period surrounding the 13D filings. However, the returns are greatest when the desired outcome is the sale of the target company and are not always significant given other activism goals. For example, Greenwood and Schor (2009) focus on the impact of the sale of the target firms on performance. They report the abnormal returns in both the short and long terms are significant only if the target firm is put into play and ultimately acquired.
The studies suggest typical goals of the activism involve changes in the board (including representation), the relaxation of takeover defenses, changes in payout policy, and the sale of all or part of the target company. Activists are successful in achieving a portion of their stated goals in more than half of the cases. There is less agreement regarding the post-filing changes in operational performance but most of the studies find small increases in payout policy and earnings (e.g., Brav et. al, 2008) . Finally, where reported, the typical holding period is relatively short, less than two years.
In a clinical study, Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) examine the efforts of one investment company, the Hermes UK Focus Fund and find evidence of abnormal returns when the fund was successful in achieving their goals. As with the broader samples, the highest returns are associated with restructuring activities such as asset sales. They also argue that U.K. law is much more shareholder activist friendly than U.S. law. As a result, British managers are more likely to be receptive to comments and suggestions from activists. Persons' belief that the Shares at current market prices are undervalued and represent an attractive investment opportunity."
Background regarding Steel Partners
13 Table 1 reports selected unadjusted and adjusted financial and market variables. In obtaining adjusted figures, the comparison firms are the ten closest GICS sub-industry firms as measured by total assets for year -1. In aggregate, the targets exhibit average characteristics with some interesting deviations. In particular, BKF underperformed its industry peers on a variety of measures. Both UIC and BKF have no long-term debt while Ronson has considerably more debt than its industry peers. Only UIC has more cash than its industry peers. Klein and Zur (2009) reports hedge fund activism targets hold significantly more cash but have insignificantly different leverage than their industry peers. months after the first known acquisition.
Steel Partners followed a similar approach with all three target firms, beginning with several attempts to privately communicate and meet with the management and board. Then Steel would begin its public campaign with letters to the board which would be simultaneously disclosed in 13D filings and press releases. These initial letters would be cordial and carefully explain Steel's primary concerns. Given their initial failure in all three cases, Steel followed with threats of proxy fights and shareholder proposals. In the case of Ronson, Steel also made two offers to buy Ronson and eventually filed suit. Table 4 outlines Steel's concerns at each target firm. Generally, the concerns involve looking for ways of adding value via asset sales or the sale of the entire company, the reduction of management entrenchment via takeover defenses and board structure, and excessive compensation and high costs in general. In this regard, Steel is similar to the hedge funds studied by Brav et. al. (2008) , Greenwood and Schor (2009) , and Klein and Zur (2009) .
The history of each targeting effort features several points of interest.
Ronson Corp.
As noted in 
Synthesis and correspondence to broader hedge fund activism studies
A common factor of the cases is Steel's focus on governance issues, particularly general board entrenchment exacerbated by the existence of a staggered board. However, it is notable that Steel used the desired governance changes primarily as a means towards bigger goals such as encouraging the sale of the company or facilitating a reduction in costs and compensation.
The relative unimportance of effecting governance changes is consistent with Brav et al (2008) who report insignificant announcement effects for activism with a governance focus. Steel's experience with their three targets corresponds with the broader evidence of Greenwood and Schor (2009) who report targets that are eventually acquired earn average abnormal returns of 25.85% over the 18 months after filing. Non-target firms earn insignificant abnormal returns. However, it should be noted that UIC was experiencing a fairly steady run up in its share price even before the Textron offer.
Of the targets, Ronson might be seen as the one where management was most successful.
That is, they kept their independence and did not make any compromises. Even so, Ronson's share returns have been poor for a decade, so the success must be deemed relative. In the case of BKF, management ignored or rejected many overtures from Steel Partners and other activists.
Then they attempted to compromise with the activists when faced with a concerted effort.
However, by this time, the activists were determined to carry all before them and saw the attempted compromise as a sign of weakness. One important difference between the two targets is the shareholdings of the officers and directors. Ronson's controlled a significant stake, which they later augmented by "bribing" another large shareholder to trade his voting rights for a consulting agreement.
Another difference between the two cases is when they were initiated. Steel first The holding periods when Steel publicly releases the goal of its activism are especially lengthy.
For example, Steel's mean holding period exceeds 55 months when it pushed for the removal of a takeover defense (13 cases) or the sale of the company or one of its divisions (15 cases) and averaged 50 months when it desired board seats (28 cases). In contrast, the mean holding period is only 24.6 months when the only evidence of activism was boilerplate language in Item 4 of the 13D statement (29 cases). Coupled with the results of Greenwood and Schor (2009) , these results support the idea that future activism studies should examine longer holding periods.
Steel's success rates are similar to those reported by Brav et. al. (2008) . For example, in the fifteen cases where the goal was sale of the company or a divestiture, the event occurred ten times. Likewise, Steel was able to obtain a board seat in 22 out of 28 attempts. Even so, the abnormal buy-and-hold returns obtained by Steel typically are insignificantly different from zero even when segmenting the sample by activism goal or activism success. 31 This lack of significance is consistent with the mixed results indicated by Steel's experiences at BKF and UIC. Namely a successful activism campaign does not guarantee a successful investment.
However, the lack of results might be driven by the relatively small sample size, especially for the longer windows.
Conclusion
Our cases suggest the following points. For managers and boards wishing to maintain their independence, the lesson is to be to dig in and refuse to negotiate, preferably while maintaining a big ownership stake. However, forcing the activist to go hostile might not be a great idea as it might lead to a lawsuit or an insatiable wolf-pack type campaign. For the activists, patience can be a virtue. However, do not let the desire for "success" come at the expense of profitability. Success was achieved at BKF and was probably a quixotic venture at
Ronson. In both cases, Steel Partners lost a great deal of money and experienced opportunity costs.
Greenwood and Schor (2009) 
